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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Russian relations) to a presumption in favor of reciprocity 8 and in
1947 (when Cold War tensions mounted) a reversion back to the
burden resting with the claimant.39
It is not clear from the opinion in the case under discussion
whether the reciprocity requirement of section 259 of the California
Probate Code in and of itself constitutes an intrusion into the field
of foreign affairs, or whether said section when read against the
United States' 1923 Treaty with Germany makes the reciprocity re-
quirement invalid. In addition, the case fails to enumerate just what
action by probate courts in administering reciprocity clauses con-
stitute inquiry into foreign affairs. The decision appears to rest on
an historical basis in that the opinion discusses how some state
courts have, in the past, interjected their own bias when con-
fronted with the reciprocity issue rather than holding to just a read-
ing of the relevant foreign law. The Kraemer court relied heavily
on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Zschernig but
Justice Douglas also failed to offer a clear definition of where the
boundary line between exclusive federal domain and legitimate state
inquiry should be drawn.
TOM ALLISON
WITNESSES-COMPETENCY-WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE OF COMMUN-
ICATION TO OR INFORMATION ACQUIRED BY PHYSICIAN-Appel-
lee suffered severe back injuries as a result of an automobile
accident due to the alleged negligence of the appellant. In the per-
sonal injury action that followed, appellee introduced testimony by
several expert witnesses to prove that his injuries and damages
were a result of the automobile accident. The appellant called Dr.
George Holiday, the chiropractor who had treated appellee prior
to the accident, to testify. The appellee objected to this testimony,
asserting that it violated the statutorily protected confidential com-
munication between physician and patient, and that at no time
had there been a waiver of this privilege.' The lower court excluded
the testimony of Dr. Holiday concluding that there had been no
waiver of the physician-patient privilege since Dr. Holiday's treat-
ment of the patient was not interrelated with that of the other
doctors who had testified. Reversing the lower court's decision the
Supreme Court of Indiana held that if a patient by way of complaint,
counterclaim, or affirmative defense, places in issue his physical
or mental condition, then he automatically waives the privilege grant-
ed by the statute as to all matters causally or historically related
38. Ch. 1160, § 1, [1945] Cal. Stats. 2208.
39. Ch. 1042, § 1, [1947] Cal. Stats. 2443.
1. The statute containing the physician-patient privilege Is IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1714
(1987).
RECENT CASES
to the physical or mental condition in issue and such waiver applies
to any physician who may have knowledge of these conditions. Col-
lins v. Bair-Ind.-, 252 N.E. 2d 448 (1969).
At common law communications between a physician and a
patient were not privileged.2 However, beginning with New York
in 1828,3 thirty four states have established some form of privilege. 4
The apparent objective of these statutes is the more effective treat-
ment of injury and disease by keeping the information obtained
by the physician in confidence. 5 The issue in this case is whether
in any particular instance the expected injury to the relationship
through fear of later disclosure in court is of greater value than
the effective administration of justice.
The physician-patient privilege like other privileges can be waived
by the express consent of the patient, 6 or the waiver may be
implied by his conduct, should he disclose all or a substantial part
of the confidential information. The basis for this implied waiver
is that allowing the patient to testify selectively without allowing
the opposing party to introduce any facts which are relevant to
his case would give the patient an unfair advantage.7
At what precise point does the patient's behavior constitute a
waiver? There are various types of conduct, including express waiver
by the patient, which have been recognized by the courts of Indiana
as effective waivers. In Lane v. Boicourt,8 the court held that
when a plaintiff in an action for malpractice testifies to an occurrence
in the sickroom, the defendant physician or a consulting physician
in attendance may testify as to what occurred. The court stated:
When the patient voluntarily publishes the occurrence
he cannot be heard to assert that the confidence which the
statute was intended to maintain inviolate continues to exist.
By his voluntary act he breaks down the barriers, and the
professional duty of secrecy ceases.
... A patient may enforce secrecy if he chooses; but, where
he himself removes the obligation, he cannot avail himself
of the statute to exclude witnesses to the occurrence. 9
Later cases, which did not deal with the issue of malpractice,
restricted this waiver of the physician-patient privilege to the spe-
2. Steinberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 263 N.Y. 45, 188 N.E. 152, 153 (1933).
3. 8 J. WIGMoRB, EVIDENCE § 2380 (McNaughton rev. 1961) citing 2 N.Y. REV. STAT.
1828, 406 (pt. 3, c. 7, art. 9, § 73).
4. 8 J. WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2380 (McNaughton rev. 1961). For complete listing of
statutes see O'Neill, Ohio's Physician-Patient Privilege in Personal Injury Case--Tme
for Reform, 16 W. REs. L. REv. 334, 335 n 7 (1965).
5. Edlngton v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 5 Hun 1, 8 (N.Y. 1871).
6. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wiler, 100 Ind. 92, 101, 50 Am. Rep. 769 (1885).
7. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. McClure, 108 Ind. App. 253, 24 N.E.2d 788, 790 (1940).
8. Lane v. Boicourt, 128 Ind. 420, 27 N.E. 1111 (1891).
9. Id. at 1113.
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cific issues raised by the plaintiffs by holding that no general waiver
occurred. 10 In 1936, in Schlarb v. Henderson," the Supreme Court
of Indiana reviewed a case in which two doctors, who had removed
the plaintiff's appendix, testified that the trouble was caused by
injuries sustained in an accident. The court held that the patient
could not object to testimony of a third doctor who had made
a pathological study of her appendix tissue and found that it had
not been injured but was chronically infected. Following this case,
in 1938 the Supreme Court of Indiana in Acme-Evans Co. v. Schnept ,12
adopting the requirement of interrelation between physicians from
Schlarb, held that the physician's testimony was privileged since
he did not attend the patient in connection with the two previous
physicians who had testified, nor was their testimony based on
information received from him. In the present case the court adopted
the rule that "[i]f a patient, by way of complaint, counterclaim,
or affirmative defense, places in issue his physical or mental con-
dition, then he automatically waives the privilege granted by the
Act as to all matters causally or historically related to the physical
or mental condition in issue."' 3 Considering the previous cases,
particularly in light of the reasoning in Lane v. Boicourt,'4 it is
the opinion of the writer that the instant case is a logical extension
of the acceptable circumstances for an effective waiver.
The majority of the courts now follow the rule that the bringing
of an action, in which an essential issue is the existence of a
physical ailment, does not constitute a waiver.15 However, there
is a definite trend toward the extension of the waiver rule. This
extension, such as in the present case, holds that the bringing of
an action, in which an essential issue is the patient's physical con-
dition, constitutes a waiver of the privilege.
In Randa v. Bear,16 the Washington Supreme Court held that
the patient had expressed a willingness to abandon the right of
medical privacy by bringing her cross complaint which would even-
tually result in the disclosure of her condition and the treatment
that she received for it.17 Following much the same line of reasoning
the Supreme Court of Alaska has held that a patient, by bringing
a personal injury action in which he places his physical' condition
in issue, is said to have given, by implication, his consent to the
physician's disclosures. 18
10. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 84 Ind. App. 563, 150 N.E. 825, 829 (1925) Citi-
zen's St. Ry. Co. v. Shepherd, 30 Ind. App. 193, 65 N.E. 765, 768 (1902).
11. Schlarb v. Henderson, 211 Ind. 1, 4 N.E.2d 205 (1936).
12. Acme-Evans Co. v. Schnepf, 214 Ind. 394, 14 N.E.2d 561 (1938).
13. Schlarb v. Henderson, -Ind.-, 252 N.E.2d 448, 455 (1969).
14. Lane v. Boioourt, 128 Ind. 420, 27 N.E. 1111 (1891).
15 Randa v. Bear, 50 Wash. 2d 415, 312 P.2d 640, 645 (1957).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 646.
18. Mathias v. Hilderbrand, 416 P.2d 8 (Alma. 1966).
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Using different lines of reasoning but reaching the same result,
the New York Court of Appeals, in Koumpf v. Smith, 9 stated that
by affirmatively placing in issue a person's mental or physical
condition the party waives the privilege in bringing or defending
a personal injury action. In so holding the court reasoned:
To uphold the privilege would allow a party to use it as a
sword rather than a shield. A party should not be permitted
to assert a mental or physical condition in seeking damages
or in seeking to absolve himself from liability and at the
same time assert the privilege in order to prevent the other
party from ascertaining the truth of the claim and the nature
and extent of the injury or condition. 20
Following this trend of thought a United States District Court
has said that, even in the absence of a statute, the physician-patient
privilege may be waived by the commencement of an action involv-
ing the physical condition of the plaintiff.
North Dakota also has a statute which protects the confidential
communications of physician patient from disclosure.2 2 In Booren
v. McWilliams, 23 it was held that the testimony in question was
not privileged since it did not contain any information necessary
to enable the physician to prescribe or act for her. In so holding
the court reasoned that in determining whether testimony was priv-
ileged, all circumstances surrounding the confidential communication
between physician and patient, and, if necessary, the opinion of
the physician and the belief of the patient, must be given consider-
ation. The Supreme Court of North Dakota, in McDonell v. Monteith,4
held that there had been an implied waiver of the physician-patient
privilege when the plaintiff called the doctor as a witness and exam-
ined him as to the condition of his arm at the time of treatment.
In the recent case of State v. Henderson the Supreme Court of
North Dakota stated:
[A]ppellant misconstrues the intent of the legislature in
enacting Section 31-01-07, N.D.C.C. The obvious intent was
to prevent the several privileges set out in Section 31-01-06,
N.D.C.C., from being used as a sword instead of a shield
[Stein v. First National Bank, 298 F. 36 (8th Cir. 1924)];
that is, to prevent the claimant of the privilege from testify-
ing as to his version of the communications and then, by
19. Koumpf v. Smith, 25 N.Y.2d 287, 289 N.Y.S.2d 667, 250 N.E.2d 857 (1969).
20. Id. at 861.
21 Burlage v. Haudenshield, 42 P.R.D. 397 (D. Iowa 1967).
22. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06 (1960).
23. Booren v. McWilliams, 26 N.D. 558, 145 N.W. 410 (1914).
24. McDonell v. Monteith 59 N.D. 750, 231 N.W. 854. (1930).
25. State v. Henderson, 156 N.W.2d 700, 709 (N.D. 1968). This case deals with the
attorney-client privilege but the reasoning should be the same in considering the physi-
cian-patient privilege.
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claiming the privilege, refusing to allow any testimony which
could possibly rebut his version. 25
From the above cases one could conclude that the Supreme
Court of North Dakota could find enough justification to imply the
waiver of the physician-patient privilege at the commencement of
an action in which an essential issue is the patient's physical con-
dition.
A party should not be allowed to pick and choose what evidence
shall be excluded by asserting the objection that certain testimony
is privileged. This may allow him to put forth the best evidence
while asserting this privilege to bar the other party from deter-
mining the truth of the claim and the nature and extent of the
injury. It is the opinion of the writer that the modern extension
of implying a waiver when a person places his physical condition
in issue by way of complaint, counterclaim, or affirmative defense
is both logical and equitable. This result does no harm to the policy
basis underlying the privilege, and therefore the waiver should be
recognized as effective.
DENNIS W. SCHURMAN
CRIMINAL LAW-DEFENSES-ENTRAPMENT-Defendant was con-
victed for possession of marihuana. The conviction resulted from
a police undercover agent inducing the defendant, through repeated
requests, to procure marihuana for the agent. The defendant intro-
duced the agent to a willing seller who sold the agent some mari-
hauna. Defendant facilitated the sale by passing the marihuana
from the seller to the agent, but neither received a share of the
drug nor profited by the exchange. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts affirmed the defendant's conviction of possession
and denied him the defense of entrapment stating, "his familiarity
with narcotics would hardly justify a conclusion of law that the de-
fendant was corrupted by the officer's conduct." Commonwealth v.
Harvard,-Mass.-, 253 N. E. 2d 346 (1969).
"Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by
an officer, and the procurement of its commission by one who
would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion,
or fraud of the officer."' 2 Though this definition appears to be
universally accepted, the difficulty of formulating a test to apply
1. Marihuana is the Mexican name for the annual herb, "cannabis sativa". The drug
prepared from the stems and leaves of the "cannabis sativa" plant is commonly referred
to as Marijuana, marajuana, maraguana, and marlahana. BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 1119(rev. 4th ed. 1968).
2. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454 (1932) (separate opinion).
